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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper Is to evaluate the Organizational 
Effectiveness (OE) program in the United States Army. Section one 
describes the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Program, and 
ei^lains the training and goals of the program.
The second section reviews research conducted by the Army 
which showed a need for OE. It also explains why OE is an important 
aspect in developing better managerial, leadership, and organiza­
tional capabilities in the Army.
The third section describes a survey conducted by the United 
States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS).
The survey served as the source of evidence for this paper, there­
fore, methodology and methodological problems of using secondary 
resources will be described in this section.
The fourth section describes factors that will increase the 
program's level of success based on the results of the OECS survey, 
and the questionnaires that they sent out. This section also con­
tains information that was obtained by telephone from Organizational 
Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs) working at various posts through­
out the Army. This section also describes factors that affect the 
success or failure of OE operations. The accomplishments in Organi­
zational Development (OD) in the civilian sector of American society 
are noted, and the various methods used to overcome problems similar 
to OE are analyzed. This section also describes OE techniques and 
compares them to civilian techniques of OD. In this way I hope to
determine what the Army can gain from civilian OD expertise.
The fifth section gives concrete recommendations for 
enhancing the Army's OE program, and some concluding thoughts con­
cerning the effectiveness and efficiency of OE.
Section 1
Organizational Effectiveness Is a program used to evaluate the 
management and leadership climate of any size unit In the United 
States Army. It Is "a process that leads to treating people as human 
beings. It Is the understanding that people are an Important part of 
an organization's day-to-day activities."^ Through attention to Its 
organizational effectiveness, the Army hopes to Improve morale, 
motivation, commitment, development of Its soldiers, and most Impor­
tantly, Its combat readiness.
Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Is a fairly new concept In the
Army, but In actuality It Is a systematic adaptation of the technique
used and commmonly referred to as organizational development (OD) In
the civilian community. A definition of OE:
Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is the systematic 
military application of selected management and 
behavioral science skills and methods to Improve 
how the total organization functions to accomplish 
assigned missions and Increase combat readiness.
It Is applicable to organizational processes 
(Including training In Interpersonal skills) and 
when applied by a commander within an organization.
Is tailored to the unique needs of the organization 
and normally Implemented with the assistance of an 
organizational effectiveness staff officer (OESO).^
The organizational effectiveness concept and the OESO provide a 
consulting capability to all commanders and supervisors who wish to 
use It. Organizational agencies are mandatory in the sense that they 
must be established on major Army Installations and that they be 
available for those commanders and supervisors who wish to use them. 
It Is however, strictly voluntary for commanders and supervisors to 
ask for OESO consulting expertise.
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The clients, or those that request the consulting advice of the 
OESO, are supervisors, staff officers, or commanders who have a prob­
lem in their area of responsibility, and seek help in solving those 
problems. The problems can be specific, general, or unknown. Many 
of the common problems in the past have been in organizational areas 
such as planning, control, influence, or leadership.
Organizational Effectiveness staff officers volunteer for train­
ing and are carefully selected. The selection requirements for Army 
officers are as follows:
- Grade of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel.
- Assigned, or projected for assignment, to an authorized 
OESO cast 52) position.
- Graduate of an Officer Advance course.
- Baccalaureate-level college degree, preferably with 
a major concentration in one of the behavioral or 
management sciences.
- Promotion potential to the next higher grade.
3- Troop eaq>erience at platoon, company, or higher level.
The Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer Course (OESOC) is
a 16-week course conducted at the Fort Ord Training Center in 
California. The first regular course was started in January 1976.
The course provides intensive training in behavioral science and 
theories pertaining to management and leadership, but these do, how­
ever, focus on military organizations. Organization theory and dy­
namics are studied in great detail. Students are taught to use the
systems approach: that is, they learn to observe and study the inter-
4dependent aspects of the entire organization. A brief explanation
of the course is as follows:
The course is based on experience or practical 
application, and more than 25 percent of the course 
tine is spent in field training— consulting or 
teaching a military unit— on various posts, under 
the supervision of a qualified instructor. Instructor 
qualification is in itself unique. A highly selected 
staff of PhD's and practicing consultants have been 
drawn together to provide the instruction. In addi­
tion, veil known author-consultants such as Dr. Paul 
Hersey, Dr. Tony Tiley, Dr. John Sherwood, Dr. Gus 
Economous, Dr. John Jones, Dr. Stan Herman, and others 
are brought in to present portions of the course. In 
addition to consulting skills, students experience and 
then are taught to facilitate a 1-week leadership and 
management development course, which has gained great 
popularity among middle managers. ̂
Training of OESOs will be stressed because it will be an 
important variable when attempting to determine the efficiency of the 
program. The OESO is trained to be a fair and impartial advisor to 
the client who seeks his aid. Although the OESOC lasts only 16 
weeks, it is academically demanding and of excellent quality. Many 
who have graduates from the course have stated that it is the best 
learning experience they have ever had— including all military 
schooling through C6SC (Command and General Staff College) level and 
graduate school.^
The OE process works in a four step activity. When an OESO is 
invited to act as a consultant he will first assess the unit, then 
help the client plan for change, next he will help implement the 
change, and finally he will follow up or evaluate the changes that 
occurred in order to determine the success of OE.
The OESO can assess the unit in several different ways and 
methods. "These methods include the use of historical data.
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observation, individual interviews, group interviews, questionnaires, 
surveys, or any combination of these methods."^
Some of the organizational processes that OESOs are generally 
interested in are:
- Communication
- Motivation
- Goal integration
- Planning
- Decisions
- Leadership
- Coordination
- Control
- Influence
- Conflict management
After the assessment has been made, the OESO then provides feed­
back to the commander, or to the client who requested the help. Feed­
back is given in a nonjudgmental way: the OESO does not tell the
client what to do, but rather what problems the OESO has found.
Often the client has already informed the OESO what problems he is 
having, but wants a method to overcome the problem. For instance, a 
commander may feel he has a communications problem, but he does not 
know where the filters to communication exist. It is therefore the 
OESO's responsibility to determine where and why these filters to 
communication occur.
When the feedback period occurs, the data provided are anonymous. 
The client is not informed where the information came from. Also, the 
data feedback is confidential. It is the client's choice whether or 
not to pass the information iq> or down the chain of command. Often 
the OESO will try to persuade the client to pass the information down 
the chain of command in order to improve the organizational process
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and open up communication. As the OE reference book states:
"Sharing the same Information up the chain of command is a different 
story— depending on who Is up there— and the OESO will not attempt to
gInfluence a client In that area."
The second stage, the planning stage, Is more prescriptive In 
nature. During this stage the client and OESO decide how to rectify 
the problems found during the assessment phase. The client will 
inform the OESO what he is able and willing to do (generally deter­
mined by time and resources available to the client and the per­
ceived importance of the problem). The OESO will inform the client 
what should be accomplished and how it should be accomplished (nor­
mally based on the OESO's experience and knowledge of organizational 
theory). There are many ways this planning stage can go. Some of 
the more typical methods planned for use are:
- Team building
- Communications training
- Role clarification
- Time management
- Performance counseling training
- Meeting management
- Transition workshops
- Leadership and management development course
- Problem solving
- Conflict resolution
- Intergroup cooperation
- Goal clarification .
- Process observation
During the implementation stage normally one or more of the 
above methods are used to overcome problems. The client, during this 
stage, is directly involved and takes on the role of the leader, 
planner, coordinator, and innovator of the process. The OESO, on the
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other hand, functions as a third party negotiator of the groups.
He may serve as an exhaust valve gmahl lag the 
client to let off steam; as a radiator absorbing 
some of the heat of the controversy, as the 
shock absorber when the going gets rough; or as 
the fog lamps when the future is hazy. The 
consultant may fulfill a variety of functions.
But one thing he is not; he is not the driver.
His responsibility is to help his client...10
The last stage of the process is the evaluation and follow-up 
period. This can be done weeks or months after the third stage. It 
is initiated in order to determine the effects of the previous action 
and to determine if the client requires more consultation.
The OESO's goal is to help the mend>ers of the organization to 
be both self-sufficient and more efficient. The OESO has absolutely 
no authority. His effectiveness as a consultant is solely derived 
from his expertise, knowledge, personality, and his ability to per­
suade the client that a managerial change is necessary. The client's 
authority is based on his legal responsibility for everything his 
organization does or fails to do. The OESO's authority is based 
entirely on his noetic ability. The OESO is totally responsible to 
the client who requested his assistance. He is not authorized, and 
in fact, is forbidden to report his findings up the chain of command.
When an OESO is requested to provide consulting services there 
are many aspects of the organization that he must analyze and study. 
He will observe the structure, mission, technology, and personnel of 
the unit.
Most missions of Army combat units are normally not difficult to 
ascertain during war time, but during peace time it is more difficult.
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The OESO must detëmlne vhst thé mission of the unit Is In order to 
determine hov successful the imlt Is, or why It has been unsuccess^ 
ful.
When studying personnel of the unlt/organlzatlon the OESO 
determines how people Interact In their work and training. The OESO 
analyzes such Interaction as cooperation, support, mission accom­
plishment, effective communication, appropriate decision, and commit­
ment toward organizational goals.
Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers determine the 
structure of the unit by studying the Table of Allowances which pro­
vides the number of personnel authorized by position. He analyzes 
the Table of Equipment to determine If the equipment authorized Is on 
hand and adequate for mission accomplishment. When studying the 
formal structure, the OESO also studies the Informal structure. He 
analyzes, for Instance, who haé the commander's confidence and why.
He attempts to clarify and use the Informal structure to the organi­
zation's advantage.
The OESO must observe the technology of the organization to 
Insure mission acconpllshment. Included in this technology observa­
tions are "equipment, the machinery, the tools used to do the job, 
the physical facilities, the work space, the language used to counsel 
or inform, how Information Is passed, how messages are handled, the 
way a unit goes about getting resources, and so f o r t h . T e c h n o ­
logical effectiveness can be observed In many ways by the OESO and 
often It Is related to administrative efficiency.
The OESO must also determine the environment of the organization
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under study. He must analyze higher headquarters requirements, 
other major headquarters requirements, and even the Interactions 
that transpire between the organization and the civilian community. 
The OESO will study and observe the chain of command to Include offi­
cers and key noncdmmlssloned officers. "Individually and collec­
tively, these people are Involved In some capacity with the com­
mander In setting goals and objectives, establishing plans, super­
vising, directing, training, and developing the unit in general.
The OE manual^s summary of organizational effectiveness states:
It Is not an approach to say, 'Let us do some­
thing to make the troops 'feel' better.' It Is 
a management approach that considers the people 
aspect of an organization in perspective with 
other critical elements. The real focus is on 
improving the organization's ability to accomplish 
its mlselon. If people 'feel better' after an OE 
operation, that's good but it's not the reason 
on which an OE operation is based.
Before explaining the steps that an OESO takes in determining 
organizational problems and solutions to those problems it is neces­
sary to explain the assumptions, goals, and conditions that must be 
accepted to Individuals before the process can be helpful. The 
following is taken from the Organizational Effectiveness Reference 
Book, published by the United States Army Command and General Staff 
College:
Assumptions
- Commanders have the responsibility for insuring that 
all decisions are consistent with mission accomplishment.
- Commanders have the responsibility for Insuring that 
decisions are supported by understandable goals.
- Groups of Individuals are the building blocks of an 
organization.
- Personal commitment to goals is more than Just personal 
agreement with goals.
- The performance of soldiers Is directly Influenced by 
the way they are managed/led.
- Commands function more effectively when individual and 
command goals are aligned.
- Soldiers support best those things they are a part of.
Goals. Given these assumptions about soldiers In 
organizations, the goal of OE Is to enhance those 
activities In the command that will result In:
- Informed and Involved soldiers.
- Alignment of Individual and organizational goals.
- Forward planning— better management of time.
- More realistic/achievable objectives.
- Continuous two-way flow of accurate Information.
- Greater cooperation within the command.
- A climate where problems and differences are 
effectively dealt with and resolved.
- Management/leadership by goals more than controls.
- Timely and more widely accepted command decisions.
- A command that responds effectively to change.
Conditions. For the OE process to be successful In an 
organization, certain conditions must exist. There must 
be:
- Command commitment to initiate the OE process and to 
continue the process once begun.
- Command willingness to allow groups to be a part of the 
planning process.
- Command willingness to accept feed back (usually per­
ceived as a personal risk).
- Command commitment to provide the necessary resources to 
support the process.
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Sectlôn II
We may ask why OE Is important to the United States Army. The 
following reasons are by no means all^inclnsive; however, it does 
provide us with an understanding of why OE can benefit the United 
States Amy.
1. With the all-volunteer Army we no longer have unlimited 
manpower resources. Army managers must be taught to carefully and 
wisely use people resources.
2. In the 1970's pressure occurred from field commanders to 
adopt some form of better managing and leadership techniques, 
prompting the Army to initiate OE.^*
3. Like all large government organizations, only limited funds 
are available to the Army. Army managers must, therefore, be taught 
to use these funds for maximum return.
4. A study conducted by the Army War College in the early 
1970's dealing with professionalism and leadership showed a necessity 
for OE.^7
5. A behavioral science study conducted by the Office of the 
Chief of Staff in the early 1970's showed that a program like OE was 
required.^®
6. Our society has changed a great deal in the last two 
decades, and one must keep in mind that the United States Army 
reflects our society. Leadership and management techniques have 
changed drastically in other organizations, but the Army has not 
always kept pace. The Organizational Effectiveness Program is a way
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to îise and understand these neir techniques and principles, and a 
way to keep up with the rest of society. If the A n y  does not keep 
up with society In the realm of leadership and management. It will 
have more and more difficulties In attracting people to the all­
volunteer force.
Since 1975, when about 200 OESOs were assigned to various Army 
levels, evaluations have been periodically conducted in order to 
ascertain the effectiveness, responsiveness, and acceptance of OE.
The last external evaluation was started on 31 June 1979. This author 
has the results of that survey. Later, It will explain how It was 
conducted. After closely studying the results of the survey conducted, 
I have been able to Identify many problem areas concerning OE In the 
United States Army.
The most Important problem Is to determine if OE Is doing what 
It is supposed to do. Are people who have used the OESO more effec­
tive in their organizational process than they were before they used 
the OESO and the OE concept?
This paper Is an attempt to determine existing variables that 
hinder the use and benefits of OE. Variables such as: interaction
among OESOs and senior officers, confidentiality of OESO's findings, 
problem areas concerning the four step process, and the training 
received by the OESOs.
This paper will compare problem areas In OE with problem areas 
in civilian organizational development CPD). An attempt %rlll be made 
to ascertain the degree of similarity among these problems, and how
12
civilians overcame the various problem areas they experienced.
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Section III
The results for this paper are In part taken from a survey and 
evaluation conducted by the Directorate of Evaluation, United States 
Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OBCS),
A questionnaire vas sent out to OESOs on 21 June 1979. Its 
purpose vas to assess the OE program and curriculum. Almost all OE 
students who graduated before 1979, and vho remained on active duty, 
received a questionnaire. January 1979 %ras the cut-x)ff to insure 
that respondents had been in the field at least 6 months. Four- 
hundred and thirty-^even questionnaires vere mailed.
On 6 August 1979 an OE Key Manager and Supervisor Question­
naire vas sent out. It generally asked the same questions that vere 
asked in the OESO questionnaire in ordcu: to "check their perceptions 
against those of their OESOs and to get a sense of the climate for 
OE from other than the OESO's perspective."^* One-hundred eighty- 
seven key managers questionnaires vere sent out based on OESO
onquestionnaire returns.
From 20 August to 12 October 1979, follov-up visits vere con­
ducted .
Information vas sought through the techniques of 
interviewing and observation to confirm and corro­
borate survey results and provide insight into 
subjective or qualitative aspects of the impact 
of OE on OE users, senior officers, key managers 
and OESOs themselves. During these visits a total 
of 92 interviews were conducted and 192 people 
were contacted.2^
Reliability and validity is normally a problem when analyzing 
secondary resources, and the survey conducted by the OECS is no
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exception. The questions asked often do not exactly measure the 
variables wished to Be tested. For Instance, the survey never 
specifically asked or measured the confidentiality of the OESO's 
findings. The questionnaires did not ask either the OESO or the 
key managers If the client's problems were always held In strictest 
confidence. What It did ask, however, was whether key managers knew 
the results of OESO's findings. From that question It could be 
Inferred that confidentiality of the client's problems was not always 
strictly adhered to.
There was also a slight problem determining the return rate of
the questionnaires. Those responsible for the survey never stated
how many questionnaires were returned and why they believed they
were not returned. A telephone call to officials at the OECS stated
that the return rate of the survey was only 42 percent for OESOs and
37 percent for key managers. This Is a very low response rate, often
2250 percent Is judged adequate. The low response rate could Indi­
cate a significant response bias. Officials at the OECS stated, how­
ever, that the return rate was low because many of the officers who 
had been sent questionnaires had either left the Army, or were not 
working In OE assignments. From this author's experience In the 
Army, this seems to be a most plausible reason; officers are often 
rotated among jobs.
For those readers who question the reliability and validity 
of the Army's survey and Its scientific value, would perhaps feel 
more comfortable calling It a census. However, whatever term Is
15
desired. It would be useful to keep In mind that the trends and 
fIndlnge discussed In this paper are not totally obtained from the 
Army's own evaluation. This author's finding and generalizations 
are derived from various references, resources. Individual Inter­
views, and his own personal military experience of twelve years.
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Section IV
This section is snb-dlvlded into nine areas of Importance 
that will determine the criteria for success of OE operations in 
the United States Army,
Key Managers Support of OE
1. Because OESOs work for key managers who are often not 
trained in OE, the key managers often do not understand its need or 
importance. If these key managers were aware of the importance of 
OE, they would be more responsive to the needs of the OESO, and 
would allow OESOs to work full time on duties that pertain to OE. 
Additionally, the entire officer corps must comprehend the izq)or- 
tance, benefits, and requirements of OE in order for it to be 
successfully implemented at all levels of command.
The OESO survey reported that 47.6 percent of the key managers 
had attended the 2-week Key Managers Course, but the key manager 
samples reported only 29.41 percent had,^ The reason for the dif­
ference is that the same group of OESOs and key managers did not 
always return the survey. In other words, these figures are taken 
from two different groups. If key managers do not understand the 
benefits derived from OE, they will not support their OESO's, and 
often will assign them other duties well out of the realm of OE 
functions. In fact, "It is significant to note that one-third of 
the responding OESOs reported spending 50 percent or less of their 
time on OE activities."^*
All Army officers, regardless of their rank, must be educated 
regarding the importance and function of OE. If Army officers have
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some knovledge concerning the central aspects of OE, they will be
less resistant to the concept. Bennls states;
,. we can predict that an anticipated change 
will be resisted to the degree that the client
system possesses little or Incorrect knowledge
about the change, has relatively little trust 
In the source of the change, and has compara­
tively low Influence In controlling the nature 
and direction of the change.
All officers must have some training concerning OE. The com­
manders at all levels In the unit must understand OE concepts. 
Importance, and benefits. If this occurs, then the OESO will be a 
most valuable asset toward organizational effectiveness. The OESO
can then save a great deal of time with his knowledge and expertise
by guiding the unit commander In Instituting change, by reinforcing 
the concept of OE, and by being more objective with problems inherent 
in the unit
It should be noted that according to OECS officials there is a 
2-week course designed solely for key managers of the OESO. The pur­
pose of the course Is to familiarize them with the salient features 
of OE so that, at the very least, they might be able to recognize the 
Importance of the program to the Army, and support It at their home 
unit.
In order to educate possible clients and senior officers, the 
Army also is teaching the concept of OE In all service schools, in­
cluding the War College, Command and General Staff College, and the 
Commander's Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The Commander's Course 
is limited to all officers who are selected for battalion level
18
comwmd; therefore, all battalion éôonanders will have some knowl­
edge of the theory and concepts of OE.
If OE were to be adopted by the entire officer corps» the 
following would result:
(1) Improved Interpersonal relations.
(2) Tendency among people to listen to others.
C3) Ifore spontaneous reaction of subordinates.
C4) Greater Involvement at all levels.
(5) Reduction In Interdepartment competitiveness.
C6) More responsible management behavior.
(7) More systematic analysis of problems.
(8) More explanation and tolerance from bosses.
C9) A reduction in the frequency of crisis.2?
An additional benefit of successful OE Implementation In the
Army would be the influence upon external forces. The United States 
Army is greatly affected by external forces. These forces must not 
only support the Army with funds to accomplish Its mission, but must 
view the Army as an organization offering opportunity, challenge, 
and a new approach to management and leadership. The public must see 
the Army as innovative, not totally authoritarian, and as a vehicle 
for individual self-satisfaction and self-actualization. The Army 
would also offer a more viable option for career opportunities.
In order for the Army to be innovative and enhance its image,
it must reach a cross-section of our society. It must correctly
analyze the external social and political environment in order to
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change their Internal stmctnre. Larry Greiner and Louis Bames 
state;
Because the management of an organisation cannot 
completely control its environment, they are con­
tinually having to Introduce Internal organiza­
tional changes which allow them to cope more 
effectively with new challenges presented from 
outside By increased competition, advances in 
technology, new government legislation, and 
pressing social demands. Most frequently organi­
zational changes are introduced In 'reaction* to 
these environmental pressures. This latter course, 
while more difficult to pursue Because employees do 
not recognize its immediate importance, is a stand­
ard that can often Be applied to organizations that 
lead rather than follow their industries. Such 
'practice' organizations can Be said to engage in 
attempting to change their environments as well as 
themselves.
The Army has Been the prime mover in equal opportunities and 
equal rights for all its memBers. It can also, with the support from 
the hierarchy. Be the front runner in Organizational Effectiveness 
among Bureaucratic puBlic organizations in the United States.
Conf identiality
2. Managers (clients) would Be more apt to request OE and OESO 
consultants if they were assured of the confidentiality of the OESO's 
findings. Although it is Believed that most OESOs are very conscien­
tious ahout observing this requirement, it is also suspected that the 
key managers they work for have ways of knowing the results and of 
passing them along to others (i.e., G-1 staff officer to division 
commander). When the questionnaire asked 66 key managers how often 
OESOs shared documentation of OE activities with them, 13 said never, 
3 said seldom, 9 said sometimes, 16 said usually, and 25 answered
20
_ 29always,
From the above Information it can be deduced that If key 
managers know the findings of the OESO, they are apt to pass the 
Information np the hierarchy. Officers In the hierarchy, and those 
especially at high command level, want to know how their subordinate 
units are doing.
According to officials at the OECS at Fort Ord, California, 
there Is not a problem with the OESO keeping his findings confiden­
tial. That Is not to say that OESOs are not under pressure to 
divulge their findings. Quite the contrary, high ranking officers 
are putting a great deal of pressure on the OESOs and the school to 
permit release of OESO findings.
Fort Ord OE officials state that confidentiality of OESO's docu­
mentation policy may have to be revised because "senior officers at 
Division level want to find out what Is happening down there." As a 
result, the school Is now releasing the general findings and trends 
found In various units by releasing case studies. Fort Ord officials 
are also considering authorizing OESOs to release general findings 
to high ranking officers (division or brigade level) concerning the 
general problem areas and trends found at various levels In the com­
mand.
In the Army, confidentiality might be more of a problem than In 
other civilian organizations. One reason for this Is that the OESO 
works for someone normally higher in the hierarchy, and often the 
OESO's efficiency report is written by him. Even though the OESO Is 
not to divulge any Information concerning his findings of his client's
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problems, hé may do so under preastire, to look good, or to enhance 
his own poaltlon of Importance, The problem concerning confiden­
tiality Is then compounded By the fact that the client Is often 
In the same hierarchy and will then have his efficiency report 
written By the same Individual as the OESO, No manager likes to have 
his problem Be known to those of higher rank Because It may reflect 
on his own efficiency.
Clients In fields other than the Army are also concerned with 
the confidentiality of the consultant. Clients may worry about the 
professionalism of the consultant and his honesty. They might also 
wonder If the consultant %wuld protect the organisation's Interests 
by not trying to steal key Individuals from other organizations, or 
releasing Information to competitors,^^ When contemplating the use 
of a consultant a client must ask: Is this consultant a professional
In whom I may repose trust and confidence, or Is he a self-serving, 
untrustworthy Individual whom I will regard as an o u t s i d e r ? I n  
the Army, a client Is more apt to view the consultant with suspicion. 
As a result, the commander In need of an OESO may very well hesitate 
to request his aid.
For one to understand the problems and concerns of the client 
concerning confidentiality, one must understand the climate of 
organizational leadership In the United States Army,
In 1971 the U.S. Army Wér College conducted a study entitled 
Leadership for the 1970*s. One of the major themes throughout the 
study portrayed —
22
The ambitious, transitory commander^-marglnally 
skilled In the compleâdtlee of his duties-^ 
engulfed In producing statistical results, fear­
ful of personal failures, too busy to talk vlth 
or listen to his subordinates, and determined to 
submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect 
faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the 
expense of the sweat and frustrations of his sub­
ordinates .
Some Army officers are so Interested In their careers that they 
would sacrifice their Integrity In order to enhance their career and 
personal goals. There are four Issues that bear consideration con­
cerning careerism:
(1) Ethical relativism. This Is "the blurring of right and 
%rrong." In other words, the end justifies thé means. This prob­
lem Is most eloquently explained by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. 
Savage In their book titled. Crisis In Command— Klsmanagement In the 
Army.
It seems clear that the exaggerated emphasis upon 
careerism to the point of acquiescing in almost 
every policy without opposition could only have 
happened In a military structure which has con­
sistently failed to develop an ethical doctrine 
of resistance. Accordingly, such shorthand injunc­
tions as 'It all counts for twenty,' 'don't rock 
the boat,' 'you can't tell the general that,' while 
often destructive, were useful attitudes for 
Individual career advancement. To be sure, ad­
vancement Is then purchased at the expense of a 
failure to examine higher orders virtually regard­
less of operational consequence.^^
(2) Loyalty. Often loyalty can mean "when a genuine, whole­
some loyalty to the boss degenerates Into covering for him, hiding
35things from him, or not differing with him when he Is wrong."
C3) "Ethical trap problem." "What becomes Important Is how
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things are perceived, rather than hmr they really are,"^^
(4) "Drive for snccess." Sncceea can come at the cost of
one's own moral and ethical convictions, and at the cost of dis-
37loyalty to subordinates. The drive for success perpetuates it­
self, and officers coming up the hierarchical ladder will mirror the
standards of their predecessors. Gabriel and Savage state:
••.the present climate does not appear to be self- 
correcting. The human drives for success and for 
recognition by seniors, sustained if not inflamed 
by the systems of rewards and management which 
cater to immediate personal success at the expense 
of a long term consolidation of moral and ethical 
strength would appear to perpetuate if not exacer­
bate the current environment. Time alone will not
cure the disease. The fact alone that the leaders 
of the future are those who survived and excelled 
within the rules of the present system militates in 
part against any self-starting Incremental return 
toward the practical application of ideal values.
A m y  officers and the units they command are very competitive 
toward each other, and careerism is one reason ccnpetition is so 
prevalent. Units are in conq>etition almost every day. Competition 
can be observed in numerous ways and can center on which unit has the 
fewest AWOLs, the most reenlistments, and the best tactical scores.
Positive competition is both healthy and desirable, but competi­
tion in the Army, as in all organizations, can also produce some harm­
ful effects. Concerning competition, Rensis and James Likert state: 
"It can cause a 'win at all cost' syndrome in which leaders become
authoritarian, creative problem solving is minimal, disagreement is
39not allowed, and communication distortion is prevalent." Also, 
"Win-lose confrontation intensifies the hostile, bitter attitudes
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that the confHctjUig parties hold toward each other,
The Anoy^muat stop the harmfnl competitiveness that is so
common among Army officers and the imits that they command. One
way of attacking this problem is to stop relying on statistics to
Judge the effectiveness of the commander and his unit. Instead of
using statistics to Judge unit efficiency, the hi^-level commander
must initiate goal-setting and management by objectives to determine
unit preparedness and efficiency. Commanders at all levels must
adopt a system of managing described by Likert as System 4:
The human organization of a System 4 firm is made 
up of Interlocking work groups with a h i ^  degree 
of group loyalty among thé members and favorable 
attitudes and trust among peers, siq>eriors, and 
subordinates. Consideration for others and 
relatively high levels of skill in personal inter­
action, group problem solving, and other group 
functions also are present. These skills permit 
effective participation in decisions on common 
problems. Participation is used, for example, to 
establish organizational objectives which are a 
satisfactory integration of the needs and desires 
of all the members of the organization and of per­
sons functionally related to it. Members of the 
organization are highly motivated to achieve the 
organization's goals. High levels of reciprocal 
influence occur, and high levels of total coordinated 
influence are achieved in the organization. Communica­
tion is efficient and effective. There is a flow from 
one part of the organization to another of all the 
relevant information important for each decision and 
action. The leadership in the organization has 
developed a highly effective social system for inter­
action, problem solving, mutual influence, and organi­
zational achievement. This leadership is technically 
competent and holds high performance goals.
In summary, confidentiality of the OESO's documentation and 
findings is a key consideration in the success of OE, Because of Army 
officers' career aspirations, their conçetitive nature, and the
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organizational climate they work In, they are not likely to request 
OESO consultation If they believe their Inept management practices 
will be released to higher authorities.
Evaluation of the Four Step Process
3. If there Is a breakdown In one of the four OE steps. It Is 
necessary to find out where It normally occurs and why. It Is sus­
pected that the assessment stage Is relatively easy to do, but once 
the client becomes cognizant of his problems and the time required to 
solve them, he may not wish to go further. The assessment stage can 
also be a problem, however, because the client may be less than open 
with the OESO, and the true problems of the organization may not be 
detected. The client may also feel that once he knows the problems 
he can solve them himself and has no need for OESO expertise.
Finally, It Is possible that the OESO Is good at assessing problems 
In the organization, but has difficulty In planning solutions.
Organizational Effective Staff Officers who responses to the 
questionnaire stated that they spent the following percentage of time 
on their various duties.
23.1% Assessment
20.6% Implementation
12.8% Planning
13.3% Building User Relationships
8.2% Professional Development
7.7% Teaching and Other OE Related Duties
7.3% Scouting and Contracting
7.0% Evaluation
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According to the respondents of the questionnaire, OESOs 
would prefer spending more time In the Implementation stage. 
Thlrty-'slx percent of those responding Indicated Implementation as 
their first preference. Qee below a list of preferred OE 
activity.
Preferred Activity Ranked 1st By 
Implementation 36.8%
Assessment 11%9%
Building Client
Relationships 11.9%
Planning 10.3%
Professional Develop­
ment 9.2%
Teaching 4.3%
Evaluation 2.2%
Scouting and Con­
tracting 1.6%
Non-OE Mission Duties 1.1%
Administrative Duties 0%
According to the following chart, the assessment and planning
stage are the most likely periods when the four-step process seems
44to start deteriorating.
THE OE STEPS
27
V
Always O)
Usually (4)
*o
I•H Sometimes (3)
I
%  Seldom (2)SM4>Q
Almost Never
Q)
i i
Assessment Planning Implementation Evaluation
Successful OPNS 
^ ^ 2 2 3  Unsuccessful OPNS
Source: Directorate of Evaluation, United States Army Organizational
Effectiveness Center and School, Evaluation, 1979, p« 11*'
Unsuccessful OE operations are more common at the assessment 
and planning stages due to the nature of Army officers. That is, 
once commanders have decided to go into OE implementation, they have 
convinced themselves of the benefits of the entire OE operation, and 
have made a definite commitment to the program.
The agent for change must be the client, the consultant's role 
is only to advise and to encourage change in organizational effective­
ness. Warner Burke believes that although the role of the consultant 
is si^posed to be an advisor, he often takes on the role of the
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client and Is more of an ’’agent of c h a n g e . I n  the Army the
possibility of this happening is slight. Managers/commanders feel 
strongly about their command position and trill not relinquish any 
managerial prerogatives. When the OESO attempts too strongly to be 
the agent of change, he is apt to be unsuccessful in the assessment 
and planning stages.
Organizational effectiveness staff officers prefer the 
implementation stage rather than the assessment and planning stage. 
This could indicate that they feel uncomfortable with these stages 
and have a difficult time obtaining the cooperation of the com­
mander/ client. A commander and his subordinates may well be less 
than open with the OESO as to the real problems of the organization.
If the assessment stage is to be successful, the OESO must ana­
lyze the present needs of the unit. He must determine the present 
level of performance and who the key trainers are, determine the 
organizational climate, analyze the procedures of the unit, and 
assess policy and decision-making procedures.When the commander 
and his subordinates are not open with the OESO concerning these 
areas, the assessment and planning stage will be unsuccessful.
Key elements must be present in order for successful changes to 
take place in the organizational climate of the Army. Bennis states 
that there are three essential elements that must be present for 
successful organizational change,
(1) The client (commander) should understand the con­
sequence of change and have equal influence in developing the 
change. Additionally, it is extremely important that the client have
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a great deal of faith In the ability of the c o n s u l t a n t . A  major
problem concerning the success of an OE operation, then, Is that
the commander may not have any faith In the OESO. That Is not to
say that the OESO Is net competent, but because of the Army's rank
structure, and the prevailing feeling that commanders and senior
officers are always right, the OESO may not be viewed as an equal,
or as competent as they are. Consequently, the OESO cannot be an
effective Initiator of change.
The change agent can be crucial In reducing the 
resistance to change. As long as the change 
agent acts congruently with the principles of 
the program and as long as the client has a 
chance to test competence and motives (his o%m 
and the change agent's), the agent should be 
able to provide the psychological support so 
necessary during the risky phases of change.
As I have stressed again and again, the quality 
of the client-agent relationship is pivotal to 
the success of the change program.
C2) "The change effort should be perceived as being as 
self-motivated and voluntary as possible."** Bennis says that this 
can be accomplished by having the support and backing of top manage­
ment.^^ Here we can detect another problem. Amqr top management 
may view OE as "soft management" and look down on commanders who 
request OE. Also, OESOs may not have the training and experience 
necessary to rationally persuade commanders to change their managerial 
style of leadership.
C3) Bennis believes the program of change "must Include 
emotional and value as well as cognitive Information elements for 
successful Implementation."^^ To rely on "rational persuasion" Is
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not enough^ a change must appeal to group sense of justice and fair-
52ness. It Is Believed that most officers are just and fair, But 
because of the rampant careerism prevailing In the Army, It Is doubt­
ful that officers can totally support a program of change as far 
reaching as OE.
Army Organizations That Require OE
4. It Is Important to ascertain at what level of the Army's 
organization the OESO Is most often requested. If this Is known, 
then the OESO can be trained In problem areas peculiar to that 
organizational level. Also Important to know Is why a particular 
level of the Army's organization Is more apt to request OE con­
sultation than others.
The response to the survey Indicated that OE clients tended to
53be located at Battalion level. This would seem understandable, 
for most Army activity functions are concentrated at that level. 
Battalions are large enou^ to maneuver Independently and are 
separate entitles of organization, hierarchy, and command. When work 
flows down from Division It normally rests with the Battalions to 
accomplish It. As a result, OE Is most often requested at Battalion 
level due to Its tremendous work load, and Its problems Inherent in 
accomplishing the %fork.
If most of the problems and needs for OE are found at Bat­
talion level, perhaps this Is where the OESOs should be located.
The opposite Is the case however, the majority of OESOs are located 
at Division level and none of them are located at Battalion. It Is
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apparent that the primary reason for this is that there are not 
enough trained OESOs to work at Battalion, and that they must be 
requested at Division.
The Army is aware of this shortcoming, and, according to offi­
cials at Fort Ord, there is a short OE course provided for Battalion 
Personnel Officers (S^l) to help them to understand the concepts and 
general aspects of OE. This short course helps both the Battalion 
Commander and the S-1 gain some knowledge of OE and therefore 
creates a more favorable climate for the OESO and the OE program In 
general.
Because we now know where OE is generally requested, perhaps 
an organizational model suited for a Battalion would prove most 
beneficial. Such a model should consider the formal organizational 
structure, technology, style of leadership, personal systems (abili­
ties, intelligence, personality traits, values, and beliefs) and
54goals of the formal organization.
OE Request for Command Transition
5. There are certain areas in which clients most often request 
the assistance of an OESO. Sixty-one percent of the OESOs reported 
that the primary issue confronting them was command transition. In 
other %/ords, 61 percent of the OE consultant roles deal with the 
transition of a new commander to a u n i t I t  is interesting to note 
that the majority of key managers feel that OESOs deal best with the 
issue concerning command transitions.^^
Do these statistics have any meaning? Certainly they must.
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Organizational effectiveness la a till extremely new to the Army and 
Its hierarchy. It la still viewed as "soft management" by many Army 
officers at all levels; consequently» there Is a stigma attached to 
an officer requesting and using the program. If, for instance, a 
Battalion Commander has been In his position for six months and 
requests OE consulting, he la going to have to justify Its use to 
his superior, peers, and subordinates. There Is a stigma attached 
to requesting OE, for It Implies that the commander has failed In 
some aspect of management, something no manager likes to do. As 
already stated, due to the "system" officers are careful to hide 
organizational problems for fear that their efficiency will be 
questioned.
Then why is there less stigma attached to OE command transi­
tion consulting as the statistics lzq)ly? Because of the nature of 
the Army's organization, command transition Is considered a trauma 
to all Involved. It means a new commander with different likes and 
dislikes, a new way of operating and a new organizational climate.
No superior, peer, or subordinate will criticize a new commander when 
he requests the consulting role of an OESO for command transition, 
for It lessens the trauma for all, and no stigma Is attached to Its 
use.
From the above discussion, It can be Inferred that there Is a
stigma attached when requesting OESOs, but the stigma Is less of a
one when used for command transition. Based on OD S3q>erlence all Is
not hopeless, however, for when OE has been operational for a longer
period of time, and Individuals have been educated to its benefits.
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OE will be used for all purposes with, less stigma attached to its 
utilization*
Types of Implexgentation Most Often Used
6t It night be useful to determine what type of implementation
is normally used by the OESO. The responses to the survey indicated
that the top five implementation techniques are action planning,
transition model, communication, team building, and problem
s o l v i n g . F r o m  this, it can be deduced that these five areas can
generally be considered the major problems in the managerial and
organizational structure of the Anxqr,
Inq)lementation encompasses a large spectrum of consideration
and no one can predict consistently what type of implementation is
always required. ",..the field has developed largely in reaction to
changes in society and organizations rather than as a result of
58deliberate planning." Following are some key considerations 
dealing with implementation in general, with some salient points con­
cerning the Army’s OE program.
Cl) If implementation is to be useful, the OESO must 
take four organizational variables into consideration. He must con­
sider people, task, structure, and technology. This is of utmost 
importance, for to change one variable will certainly cause an effect 
on another. Harold J. Leavitt says concerning the four variables:
These four are highly Independent, so that 
change in any one will most probably result 
in conçensatory Cor retaliatory) change in 
others. In discussing organizational change, 
therefore, I shall assume that it is one or 
more of these variables that we seek to
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change. Sonettves vè may aim to change one 
of these as an end In itself, sometimes as a 
mechanism for affecting some changes in one 
or more of the others,*9
A major problem for the OESO and the client, then, is that they 
are often able to change the people variable, but only the hierarchy 
has the authority to change the structure, task, and tools. Conse­
quently, until the OESO and the client can take a more positive role 
in the three remaining aspects of implementation and change, OE will 
be an uphill battle.
It is important for the Army's hierarchy that OE officials
analyze the structure and technology of Army units. As one OD
author put it:
One concept of organization development calls 
for change in both technology and structure,., 
and/or change in individuals and their inter­
action processes...rather than for efforts to 
change only the people, only the structure 
process, or only the technology of the organiza­
tion.*0
One aspect of OE that is not discussed much in the Army and 
could possibly open up a whole new concept of Army bureaucracy is the 
possibility of changing the bureaucratic and personnel structure of 
the Army organization. This paper cannot attempt to discuss this 
aspect of OE at any length, but it may be the cause of some of the 
Army's major management problems. "OD means that practitioners must 
pay considerably more attention to industrial engineering, job 
design or re—design, and the whole area of socio-technical systems.
C2) An inherent problem with OE is that it may be ini­
tiated and utilized at one level in the command, but not higher up.
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Many organizational proBlena^originate.at the next higher level of 
management «
A programmer may he designed to train the lover 
levels of management and may omit the higher 
levels, whose faults will consequently appear 
greater In the eyes of those whom they control.
This Is a good way of producing rebellion.
C3) One of the most Important aspects of OE Is team
building. Team building Is "...Intended to make a group effective
and achieve unity of purpose. The Araqr, like most large
organizations, normally has staff and line personnel vying for
power, control, and prestige. The purpose of team building Is to
eliminate this Internal conflict, and encourage people to work
together for a common goal. Team building should be the first step
In an OE Implementation program; without It all other programs may
well fall. Patten and Vail say:
...successful team building efforts which 
e3q>and self-awareness, laq>rove the Individual's 
self-concept, diffuse openness, and enable 
solving and decision-making In a group situa­
tion are fundamental to starting on strategic 
OD, launching an MBO effort, or enabling the 
rewards system In an organization to act as 
an Incentive for performance.^^
Few organizations Implement OD by proceeding on a step-by- 
step basis with team building as the first s t a g e . T h e  Army Is no 
different, they often Implement various aspects of OE without first 
promoting team building.
G») Management by objectives (MBO) has been a common word 
In the Army for almost a decade. Management by objectives Is a 
method of bringing together personal and organizational goals In
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order to create a oneneaa, a tôm oa purpose, and a way of achieving 
"...satisfaction of hlgher^level ego and self^ctuallzatlon needs.
Until the recent adoption of OE By the Army, MBO functioned in 
only one way. Goals were selected By the unit commander, often with 
little Interaction or input from others. He selected the goals and 
everyone else attempted to meet them. Perhaps the reasons for this 
are that the unit commander felt he was the most qualified individual 
to determine goals, or he did not have an organisation that functioned 
as a team. Perhaps now, with the emphasis on OE and the inq>ortance 
attached to team building, MBO may finally work.
(5) Job enrichment (JE) is the least used and asked for 
method of implementation in the Army^s OE p r o g r a m . W h a t  does this 
mean? Does it mean that all jobs in the Army are so enriched that it 
is not a problem, or does it mean that OESOs and conaanders can find 
few ways to enrich the duties, responsibilities, and functions of 
its soldiers and officers? This is perhaps a major question that 
should be asked by all who are interested in having a well trained 
and professional Army, capable of fulfilling its primary mission—  
that of defending the United States. Let us assume that the answer 
to the question just posed is that OESOs and commanders can find few 
ways to enrich the jobs of their personnel, and then let us try to 
determine why. Some of the following reasons may be:
CL) Commanders are not humanistic and have little 
real concern for the needs of people, other than the basic needs.
C2) CoiBBianders are too used to the command and 
obedience style of management, and they cannot change their method
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of operating. They have functioned this way for years, and it has 
obtained for then promotions, security, and increasingly important 
jobs.
C3) Army managers normally serve in command posi­
tions for only a short time Q  or 2 years), while the soldier and 
NCO may work in the same Job for a number of years. The Army Com­
mander, in the short time he has, must be successful, make a name 
for himself, receive an outstanding efficiency report, eventually 
get promoted, and then move on to other duties. In the short time 
that he commands, he has little time, even if he were inclined to, 
to enrich the Jobs of people he controls.
If we believe that 'both JE and 
MBO are fundamentally grounded on 
self-control and humanistic notions.
Both can become Important corner­
stones of OD and bases for entirely 
new styles of organizational manage­
ment.**
The Evaluation Stage
6. It is important to determine what evaluation indicators are 
used by the OESO to understand his success in an OE case. There are 
a number of indicators that can determine this. The key point, how­
ever, is that there seem to be myriad ways OESOs attempt to determine 
whether or not their OE efforts have been successful, and none of 
them seem to be used with any particular effectiveness.
The lack of effective methods for determining OE successes is a 
major shortcoming of OE. The survey showed that 160 OESOs used 
client's comments 8.6 percent of the time to determine the effective­
ness of their OE actions. "Cut feelings" were used by 151 OESOs
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11.7 percent of the time. Interviews were nsed by 140 OESOs only 
4.4 percent of the time. Other evaluation Indicators were shown, 
hut there seemed to he no trend or systematic method for evaluating 
OE operations.
If OESOs and managers cannot effectively evaluate OE opera­
tions , they will not realize what they have, or have not, accom­
plished. If an evaluation system Is not utilized "...managers will 
often think ahout what they have failed to achieve. Instead of 
remembering the positive effects. The provision of positive 
Information can result In a powerful reinforcement to further
action."70
Another important consideration of the evaluation stage Is that 
It should he planned well In advance. In fact, the type of evalua­
tion and what Is to he evaluated should be considered prior to the 
implementation stage; that way a more effective analysis of the 
problem can be made. "The follow-up has not been clearly foreseen 
In designing the training stage. In fact, many programs have been 
launched In the pious hope that some benefits must surely follow if 
the seeds of wisdom are strewn. Sometimes this is true, but is the 
pay-off maximal?"
The above discussion highlights a key problem area of the 
Army's OE program. The Army must better plan for the evaluation 
stage, formulate the stage well in advance in order to pinpoint 
objectives, and develop à more formulated evaluation plan or model 
than the haphazard method they are now using.
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Traijalng of the PESO
7. Organizational Effective Staff Officers attend 16 weeks of 
Intensive training on OE, One nust, however, ask If this Is enough 
training for the OESO to perform thé myriad duties that hé must 
perform.
Asstalng an OESO Is Intelligent, sincere, Interested In his 
duties, and has grasped all of the OE training. Is It still enough? 
Organizational Development consultants In the civilian field 
normally will have had years of experience behind them and usually 
will have worked for a large firm where additional expertise Is 
available,
To compound the problem even more, an OESO performs his duties
for three or four years and then moves on to other assignments. In
other words, the OESO, regardless of his sincerity, intelligence,
and professionalism, Is still a novice. "The novice can bring
specialized knowledge and skills to a client, but an inexperienced
consultant is often unable to reduce risk for the client and, in
73many cases, may actually Increase the probability of failure."
According to the survey "OESO graduates appear to be most 
satisfied with the emphasis on group processes and the four-step 
process while they generally disagree that the course needs more 
enq)hasls on self-directed study and didactic Instruction."^^
When OESOs were asked in the survey If the OECS adequately pre­
pared them, most agreed that they were adequately prepared for the 
assessment, planning, and tnq>lamentation stage. Ironically, most 
felt that they were inadequately prepared for the evaluation stage.
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The evaluation stage (#e discussed on pages 37 and 38) requires 
additional educational Instruction«
In summary, the training and experience level of the OESO Is 
somewhat suspect. The system of procuring relatively Junior officers 
as Internal consultants In the U.S, Army Is net the best possible 
system. More will be said about this later in the recommendation 
section.
Senior Officers' Concepts of OE
8. The OESO's Interactions with senior officers is a prob­
lem. "A summary of the factors contributing to OE Ineffectiveness"
...lists lack of senior officer support and lack of acceptance as 
the two major problem areas."^^
Many senior officers who view OE with suspicion are those who 
have had little or no exposure to Its concepts, Importance, and 
rewards. They believe that the concepts are Idealistic values 
about human nature and are not totally proven, or that it is just 
a nice idea to make people feel good.
Those officers who style their whole managerial and leadership 
role on the command and obedience role must find ways of changing.
"In other words, we have a field of OD today because a centuries- 
old leadership style (command and obedience) has become obsolete,
The authoritarian approach to management and leadership that most 
senior officers were exposed to 20 or 30 years ago no longer works.
Given the nature of social systems In thé modem 
organizational world, the command/obedience style 
of management Is less and less appropriate to 
changing an organization since research shows that
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this style has high, probability of producing un­
intended consequences that are often Inimical to 
the goals of the change.
The problem, as it no%r stands, is that there are too many
senior officers mho have never been exposed to the concepts of OE,
and they vlev it as needless and worthless.
Some officers in the group of 06 and above do 
not believe they need OE assistance and the 
hard sell approach to OE may be counter­
productive with these officers. OESOs must 
look for target of opportunities that directly 
address the most serious management problem 
perceived by that group. These senior officers 
think they are good leaders and their career 
success attests to this fact. The impact of 
the lack of use of OE by senior officers is 
noted by subordinates in their chain of com­
mand and consequently OE is not used %yithin 
their organization. This Is an area that needs 
further study and refinement of how best to 
approach this group of officers. Some of these 
officers tend to look on the OESO as a quality 
and valuable resource who could be better 
utilized In a regular Army line unit position.
Too many senior officers today use the power and coercion
models of leadership as their primary method of achieving results.
If they can be taught to change this style, and adopt what Is called
the consensus and insight model of managing, they would have a far
more productive organization.
The consensus and insight model is based on the 
concept that once people who work together gain 
Insight into the fundamental dynamics of human 
relationships In a context of purposive Joint 
effort, they are ready to Implement problem 
solving approaches...based on an understanding 
and agreement.
Additionally, "we too often assume that organization change Is for 
'those people downstairs,' %yho are somehow perceived as less
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Q1Intelligent and leas productive than ^those upstairs.
Senior officers too often feel that change is good for those 
below them, but not necessary for them. They fall to realize that 
they are frequently the cause of organizational malfunctions. Addi­
tionally, they believe that because of their high position they are 
the most intelligent and hnowledgeable individuals, and should, 
therefore, make all decisions. Because of the problem discussed 
above, most Army officers hesitate to be open with superiors, and 
at times, even with subordinates. The reason for this is inherent 
in the nature of the hierarchy, its command structure, its per­
formance appraisal system, and a "can do" attitude at all costs. 
Senior officers must be "aware that the real danger to group 
effectiveness is not in the 'explosions' which people believe may 
result when they bring problems into the open, but in the inertia 
which results from evading problem situations."
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Section V
RecôMBBèndatlona and Concilia Iona
1. All officers most Be educated in the concepts of OE. The
Army la trying to accomplish this By teaching OE at all officers*
schools and service colleges. The primary target area, however, must
Be senior officers. These officers must Be encouraged to adopt OE,
for if the Army is to change its concept and style of management,
those in the hierarchy must initiate the change. This will not Be
easy to accomplish as GaBriel and Savage point out.
Major institutional changes are usually fiercely 
resisted in all organizations since reform means 
a change in Both the status quo and the anticipated 
status quo, each of which guarantees the personal 
career Investments and eaq>ectations of large 
numBers of people, in this case high-ranking offi­
cers. It is a fact of political experience, and 
all armies are political, that when reform is not 
puBllcly resisted it is often Bureaucratically 
and covertly sabotaged, so that the shadow of change 
is often projected while the substance of organiza­
tional vested interest remains intact. Elites do 
not easily relinquish their power, prestige, and 
income, nor do individuals readily repudiate personal 
histories. No one who has examined the proliferation 
of federal agencies, their redundance, their in­
effectiveness, and often their irrelevancy and some­
times malignancy can escape this conclusion. The 
history of political and governmental reform is not 
a happy one.®^
Only with time, education, and perhaps direction from civilian 
authority can the Army change its style of leadership and management. 
There is no easy or quick solution for changing the attitude of its 
senior officers. It will take time and effort to affect change.
The rewards, however, will be most gratifying, for if the Army can 
become an organization that is innovative in its leadership and
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managerial style, support from external sources in society is 
likely. Even more beneficial, the internal structure will be more 
productive, efficient, and capable of fulfilling its mission.
2. Confidentiality of OESO's findings is going to be a major 
problem in time to come. Some of the more senior officers believe 
that findings and documentations of the OESO's work should be turned 
over to superiors. They claim that the advantage of this is that 
problems inherent in the total structure of the organization may be 
solved, rather than just those of a subordinate unit^ Additionally, 
organizational members will see the OE effort as an integrated and 
coordinated program.
The disadvantages of this approach, however, outweigh the advan­
tages. If OE is to be successful in the Amy, documentation and 
information obtained by the OESO must be kept in strictest confidence. 
Because of the nature of the Army's hierarchy and management system 
of rating officer performance, no other way is possible.
It is, therefore, recommended that OESO documentation be kept 
confidential, and that the Army continue to circulate case studies 
for managers and commanders to keep abreast of current leadership 
problems throughout the Army. It is interesting to note that all 
OESOs interviewed feel that their documentation concerning OE activ­
ities should be kept in strictest confidence between them and their 
clients.
3. It is recommended that senior officers stop relying on 
statistics to measure a commander's worth. Mutually agreed upon
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objectives must be given true meaning Instead of "lip service."
When this occurs, officer» will be more apt to Be open and honest 
with superiors. Additionally, the use of performance objectives, 
which means that the superior and subordinate mutually agree on 
objectives and standards to Be met, would de-emphaslze careerism.
4. The OECS and OESO must give more impetus to the evaluation 
stage. By doing this they will be better able to judge correctly 
the success of OE operations. Additionally, by planning the 
evaluation method early In the planning stage, OESOs and clients 
will Be better able to establish goals and use them to measure the 
OE operation.
5. Any successful OE operation will depend on the ability of 
the OESO. As stated earlier, the majority of OESOs are Intelligent, 
capable, and truly Interested In doing the best possible job. Due 
to their lack of rank and experience In the Army, the OESO's major 
problem Is dealing with more senior commanders. This lack of rank 
and experience cannot help but be a hindrance In their effectiveness 
as a consultant to superior officers.
If OE Is to be more than just applying formulas, and Is to 
become a method of changing behavioral patterns of managing, then 
the OESO must have a rank equal to or above that of the client In 
order to effectively persuade the client to change his leadership 
style. A captain, or major, will have very little Influence when 
dealing with more senior officers.
As stated earlier, there are many senior officers who function 
with the authoritarian style of leadership, and are unwilling, or
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perhaps unable to change. There are, however, many senior officers 
who are Innovative In the techniques of managing.
Considering the above discussion, the following recommendstIon 
Is made: That senior officers close to retirement who have proven
their worth as excellent officers, be given the option of extending 
their length of service, and be trained and then assigned to OE 
duties.
A similar recommendation, but for other reasons, has been formu­
lated by Gabriel and Savage.
Ideally, no such person would act In organiza­
tional parallel with former peers and friends...
None would ever be eligible for promotion, decora­
tion, public citation, or any singular honor; 
they would serve in the anonymity traditional to 
the German general staff officer.*
These OE officers would not be "yes" men perpetually Interested 
In furthering their own careers. Their records would be carefully 
scrutinized. Insuring they were the type of Individuals who were of 
the Independent and honest type. They would be the type of officers 
who had never feared to speak out In opposition to a superior when 
the need arose, even If their ratings for efficiency and Integrity 
were at stake. "The selection of these men would be difficult. 
Possibly a detailed examination of records might reveal men who never 
lied, who demonstrated genuine creativity during their service, and 
who stood up for their men."®^
If this recommendation were followed, the Army's system, their 
"yes" men, and the careerism Inherent In the organization would not 
affect these senior OEs.
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Here then le a groop of cuetodlans none of whom 
le pénanent; their aaelgnnents could not he 
self-perpetuating; all final selections after 
screening vould he at random; the men chosen 
could not he promoted, decorated, or honored; 
they could not have a career. Such men would 
have little likely Interest In corrupting the 
sysgyn and every likely Interest In Improving
Other benefits derived from this recommendation were found by 
the %ero% Corporation. They have used selected senior executives 
who were about to retire, or who did retire were recalled, as con­
sultants for organizational development. %erox found that these men 
were much better able to Identify with the problems of the client; 
consequently, the client was far more open and honest with the con­
sultant. If the Army’s hierarchy will support the concept of senior 
pre-retirement officers as OE consultants, the chance of OE developing 
Into a more worthwhile and productive program will be vastly en­
hanced.
Without top management support and without con­
sultants with proven track records as managers,
a practice such as Xerox’s is questionable. If
they see them as over the hill, some managers 
might avoid using preretirement executives. Yet 
companies that do use their executives’ accumu­
lated wisdom can gain a resource edge over their 
competition.
Organizational Effectiveness In the Army will have some success
as it Is now structured. Statistics have already shown this to be
the case.
Evidence Indicates that Organizational Effective­
ness COE) Is beginning to pay off within the Army. 
Significant findings clearly show that units using 
OE had higher levels of unit effectiveness and open 
communication than units that did not. Reports of
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recent appllcetions of OE to such key Issues as re- 
ealistaents, retention, and conmander transition 
have documented sieasuraBle cost benefits as veil as 
Improved readiness, In addition, trends Indicate 
that unite using OE had higher levels of job satis­
faction and commitment, OE usage has Increased from 
40 percent in 1978 to 58 percent In 1979.8*
It Is strongly recommended that to make OE a truly effective program
to rectify thé managerial and organizational problems of the Army,
the changes suggested In this paper be Instituted.
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